GREENSPAN’S LAMENT: INCENTIVE MECHANISMS AND THE
CONTAMINATION OF THE SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS OF
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS FROM RISKY DERIVATIVE
SECURITIES
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INTRODUCTION
On October 23, 2008, economist and former Federal Reserve Chief Alan
Greenspan lamented, “[t]hose of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending
institutions to protect shareholders’ equity, myself included, are in a state of shocked
disbelief,” noting further that, “[t]his modern risk-management paradigm held sway
for decades,” and “[t]he whole intellectual edifice, however, collapsed in the summer
of last year.”1 Greenspan’s lament was not well received,2 least of all by those of us
who behaved in our borrowing practices but found ourselves underwater on our
mortgages, found our retirement account values dwindling, and even found our
money market funds frozen. Indeed, the well had been poisoned by the errant
behavior of others.
Greenspan’s worldview was premised on centuries of research and empirical
data on the benefits of an economic and political system that emphasized freedom of
contracting and privatization of ownership.3 To doubt this collective human wisdom
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Edmond L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulations, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008,
at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html?_r=
1&hp&oref=slogin.
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Id. (“Critics, including many economists, now blame former Fed chairman for the financial crisis that
is tipping the economy into a potentially deep recession . . . that he failed to rein in the explosive
growth of risky and often fraudulent mortgage lending. ‘You had the authority to prevent
irresponsible lending practices that led to the subprime mortgage crisis’ [inquiry by Representative
Henry A. Waxman] . . . ‘Do you feel that your ideology pushed you to make decisions that you wished
you had not made?’ Mr. Greenspan conceded: ‘Yes, I’ve found a flaw”.)
2

See Avinash Dixit, Governance Institutions and Economic Activity, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 5, (MARCH 2009)
(explaining that market economies are premised on governance for the security of property rights, the
enforcement of contracts, and for collective action); see also JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH,
ECONOMICS IN PERSPECTIVE: A CRITICAL HISTORY (Houghton Mifflin 1987) (tracing these concepts
through history).
3
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would be to deny the benefit of global growth from market economics. Yet in
retrospect and viewed from a different perspective, the combination of imbalances in
borrowing and investment in the American economy, high levels of public and
private leverage, the housing boom, and the extensive cross-collateralization and
speculative trading through structured financial derivatives appeared bound to
collapse the edifice.
This article attempts to unravel this paradox and to better diagnose and
correct the mistakes that led to the current crisis by looking deeper into the
incentives, policies, and ideologies upon which Greenspan’s world view rested. This
exploration does not attempt to provide short term suggestions to mend the
economy or even purport to know the precise formulation of regulatory regime
corrections. This article uses the economic and legal theories, governmental policies,
and rules of the game to illustrate how those inform and guide banking and securities
regulations, which in turn inform and guide the behavior of market participants.
The different policy objectives and regulatory mechanisms of banking
regulations—to preserve the safety and soundness of the system through
oversight—and those of securities regulations—to preserve confidence in public
securities through a regime of disclosure—operate with different dynamic responses
and can be at odds during times of crisis and panic. The reality of complex
regulations and financial products, real time trading, the involvement of speculators,
and the externalization of risk through derivatives all challenge the underlying
assumptions of competitive markets. In response, optimal regulatory regimes need
to have the flexibility to respond dynamically, and this can include prophylactic
components until longer term solutions are devised.
Greenspan’s choice of words reminds us that the architects of modern
economic theory have built an edifice of rules, regulations, and policy
recommendations upon assumptions and premises about the behavior of markets,
individual participants, and groups. The result is a set of policies and regulations that
form the “rules of the game” and establish the incentives for people and groups to
behave, react, and respond.4
For all the theoretical and architectural genius behind this edifice, we are now
experiencing the disastrous and unintended consequences wrought when the
assumptions underlying the edifice cannot sustain dynamic external pressures. How
did the regulatory mechanisms in banking, securities, and financial services provide
4

See infra Parts I, II.B-D, III.A (discussing several landmark concepts in the evolution of these ideas).
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incentives for persons and institutions across the economy to poison the well? Is the
ideology of privatization and deregulation to blame for building up the imbalances
that led to the current meltdown, or is it simply a matter of a few incremental tweaks
that are needed to realign incentives? The question is not a trivial one because we
must take immediate measures to avoid further economic collapse while finding the
correct structural adjustments to build a solid edifice for the future. Making the
structural and regulatory adjustments is among the main challenges of our times,
requiring a clear understanding of how the current structures behave dynamically.
With that goal in mind, this article retraces several key premises in economic
theory and the process of formation, implementation, and adjudication of the
statutes and regulations that form the legal framework to implement those theories.5
The article begins by framing the problem in both an historical context and by
indicating the regulatory challenges. Next, the article reviews the economic theories
that influenced the regulatory regimes and rules of the game that encouraged and
permitted the situation to arise. This includes a description of the dynamic nature of
policy formation and social choice in the context of our democratic institutions for
formation, implementation and adjudication of “the law.” By contrasting the GlassSteagall Act of 1933 with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999,6 the article illustrates
the implications of these theories and dynamic realities. This contrast exposes the
challenge in solving for safety and soundness with tools designed for disclosure that
are premised on allowing risk takers to make informed decisions that might lead to
failure or loss. The article concludes with some structural implications for revising
the regulatory regimes affecting our banking and financial system.
I. FRAMING THE PROBLEM
The historical context for the ongoing banking and financial crisis lends
insight into the theoretical discussion and comparison of regulatory regimes. As of
mid November 2008 and “[s]ince late 2006, 303 major U.S. lending operations have
‘imploded.’”7 In perspective, in the ninety-three-year period from 1867 to 1960,
there were six periods of severe economic downturn that led to widespread distress
5 This article does not attempt to provide a survey of the vast literature on the subject, nor does it
purport to reflect a comprehensive view of the field. The aim is to illustrate the dynamic
interdependencies connecting the influence that seminal economic theories have on our institutions of
law and social choice and how these might explain the behavior of individuals and institutions in the
context of the current crisis.
6

See infra notes 19, 93-95 and accompanying text (discussing these acts).

7 The Mortgage Lender Implode-O-Meter, Tracking the Housing Finance Breakdown: A Saga of Corruption,
Hypocrisy, and Government Complicity, http://ml-implode.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
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and unemployment; four of these included major banking crises.8 In particular, from
1929 to 1933, one third of the nation’s banks disappeared, failed, or merged,
resulting in a one-week cessation of all banking activities.9 In response, regulators in
1933 suspended payments in an attempt to stabilize the downward spiral, but the
system response was less than favorable.10 As described by Friedman and Schwartz:
Deposits of every kind in banks became unavailable to
depositors. Suspension occurred after, rather than before, liquidity
pressures had produced a wave of bank failures without precedent.
And far from preventing further bank failures, it brought additional
bank failures in its train. More than 5,000 banks still in operation
when the holiday was declared did not reopen their doors when it
ended, and of these, over 2,000 never did thereafter. . . . The “cure”
came close to being worse than the disease.
One would be hard put to it indeed to find a more dramatic
example of how far the result of legislation can deviate from
intention than this contrast between the earlier restrictions of
payments and the banking holiday under the Federal Reserve System,
set up largely to prevent their repetition.11
The disconnect between regulatory intention and the systemic dynamic
response stand as a lesson to regulators. Today’s crisis, while not entirely unique, has
its own set of driving forces. Attempting to avoid a repeat of the 1933 banking
panic, Congress implemented numerous regulatory authorities, institutional
measures, and mechanisms.12 Over time, changes in the underlying markets,
financial products, and behavior of participants have diminished, leading the
International Monetary Fund to conclude recently that “an adverse feedback loop
between the banking system and the global economy appears to be unfolding, as
weakening economic conditions reinforce the credit deterioration and stress in
mortgage, credit, and funding markets, with risks also rising in certain emerging

MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1857-1960 677 (Princeton Univ. Press 1971) (1963).
8

9

Id. at 678.

10

See id. at 330.

11

Id.

Among those authorities and measures, the Glass Steagall Act disallowed common ownership
between investment and commercial banks. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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markets that had shown considerable resilience until recently.”13 One key change has
been the relative importance of nonbank financial institutions to the function of the
global economy.
Several conditions and factors converged to precipitate the current financial
crisis in the United States, but mortgage lending practices are like the straw that
broke the camel’s back. This straw was loaded on several macroeconomic
imbalances of concern for decades: negative savings, both public and private, and
decades of trade deficits. These imbalances persisted within a world of increasing
integration of financial services and banking, a growing role for nonbank financial
institutions, a period of low bank failures, and a proliferation of structured credit
instruments.14 With foresight in 2006, the President and CEO of the New York
Federal Reserve said:
[T]he greater relative importance of nonbank financial
institutions also means that distress among these institutions has the
potential to have a substantial impact on market behavior and
liquidity. Understanding these relationships is an important part of
the risk management challenge for banks, even in a world where
derivatives have helped spread risk more broadly.
The innovations that have taken place in the credit derivatives
market were driven to a significant degree by the losses experienced
in past crises, but most of the growth in this market has occurred in
relatively favorable overall economic and financial conditions
....
Against the backdrop of an apparently healthy financial
system, market participants report a substantial rise in transactions
leverage, erosion in the use of loan covenants, more favorable
financing terms for hedge fund counterparties, and especially a
13INTERNATIONAL

MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: FINANCIAL STRESS
AND DELEVERAGING, MACROFINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY (Oct. 2008) available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/02/pdf/text.pdf (assessing the key issues, fault lines and
systemic vulnerabilities in global financial markets).

14 Timothy F. Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York and current Secretary of the Treasury, Remarks at the N.Y. Univ. Stern School of Bus.:
Implications of Growth in Credit Derivatives for Financial Stability, (May 16, 2006) available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2006/gei060516.html.
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pressure to reduce initial margin against OTC derivatives exposure to
hedge funds. But the concern is that this sustained period of very
low credit losses and low volatility works to hold down measures of
the underlying economic risk in these exposures. This combined
with the range of factors I just discussed, raises the odds that market
participants will be faced with negative surprises in the event of a
more adverse macroeconomic environment. And this could have
more negative implications for market dynamics and liquidity as
market participants react to those losses and attempt to reduce their
exposure to future losses.
....
. . . [W]e believe that the major dealers, as well as the large
commercial and investment banks, should take a cold, hard look at
financing conditions and margin practice, particularly with respect to
hedge fund counterparties and in OTC derivatives . . . to try to better
understand the potential scale of losses the firm may face, and to
carefully examine how well risk exposures reflect the overall risk
appetite of the firm, and the size of the capital and liquidity cushion
maintained in relation to those exposures. . . .
....
. . . We have been through a period of relatively favorable
financial conditions, and the prospect for future stability will depend
in part on the degree of care and conservatism market participants
bring today to judgments about opportunity and risk management.15
Greenspan’s lament is that “market participants” did not heed Geithner’s
exhortation. What’s a regulator to do? One might start by recognizing the
magnitude of the problem and taking a quantitative look at risk exposure:
Notional amounts of interest rate derivatives outstanding grew 22
percent to $464.7 trillion in the first half of 2008. For the year as a
whole, interest rate derivatives notionals rose 34 percent. The
notional amount of outstanding of credit default swaps (CDS)

15

Id.
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dropped 12 percent to $54.6 trillion in the first half of 2008. CDS
notional growth was 20 percent for the year as a whole.16
The notional value of derivatives held by U.S. commercial banks
increased $1.8 trillion in the second quarter, or 1 percent, to $182.1
trillion. . . . Changes in notional volumes are generally reasonable
reflections of business activity, and therefore can provide insight into
revenue and operational issues. However, the notional amount of
derivatives contracts does not provide a useful measure of either
market or credit risks.17
Even though notional volumes are not themselves a measure of market or
credit risk, in context, the data and remarks are ominous. As for the data, in
comparison to the notional value of $464.7 trillion, the total Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) for the entire world in 2007 was $54.3 trillion, and the market
capitalization of all the world’s stock markets combined was $64.6 trillion.18 More
recently, on September 23, 2008, the Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission commented on the regulatory relationship to these figures:
The failure of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to give regulatory
authority over the investment bank holding companies to any agency
of government was, and based on the experience of the last several
months, a costly mistake. There is another similar regulatory hole
that must be immediately addressed to avoid similar consequences.
The $58 trillion notional market in credit default swaps [CDS]—
double the amount outstanding in 2006—is regulated by no one.
Neither the SEC nor any regulator has authority over the CDS
market, even to require minimal disclosure to the market. This is an
area that our Enforcement Division is focused on using our antifraud
authority, even though swaps are not defined as securities, because of
concerns that CDS offer outsized incentives to market participants to
see an issuer referenced in a CDS default or experience another credit
event.
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., Summary of Recent Survey Results,
http://www.isda.org/statistics/recent.html (last visited on Nov. 2, 2008).
16

COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND
DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, SECOND QUARTER 2008 (2008) available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-115a.pdf (last visited Feb. 03, 2009).
17

18

World Bank Development Indicators Database, available at http://www.worldbank.org.
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. . . CDS buyers can ‘naked short’ the debt of companies
without restriction. This potential for unfettered naked shorting and
the lack of regulation in this market are cause for great concern.19
For its part, The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) allowed
national banks to “enter into contingent credit default swaps (‘C-CDS’) and hold
below-investment grade debt to hedge and mange the counterparty credit risks and
liability exposures that arise from its derivative activities.”20 Under its “safety and
soundness” review, the OCC noted that the “proposed risk management activities
raise unique reputation risk issues.”21 The views of these three regulatory bodies—
the Federal Reserve, SEC, and OCC—frame the analysis which follows as an inquiry
into the theoretical, economic, and practical regulatory foundations of the current
crisis. Following the discussion of those policies and decisions which led to these
regulatory “lacuna,”22 this article will illustrate the theoretical principles behind the
dynamic evolution from the Glass-Steagall Act to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
II. ECONOMIC FOUNDATION
Contrasting views of the role of government regulation between the Glass
Steagall Act and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act illustrate the tension between
traditions of free market economics and the need for regulatory restraint of market
forces, both of which have been a theme of modern political economy. The
contours of the debate center on efficiency, ownership, social cost, and incentives.
In other words, how to optimize public welfare through the institutions of society.
Entrenched views on these maters have, in turn, become the contours of political
ideology, the proper role of government, and the design of regulatory incentives.
The behavior of market participants in balancing their gains with their risk exposure
and potential losses is the paradigm of “self-interest” which appeared to go off the

Christopher Cox, Chairman of U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Testimony Before the Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, Concerning Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets (Sept.
23, 2008), available at http:www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts092308cc.htm.
19

20O.C.C.

Interpretive Letter #1051 (March 2006) available at http://www.occ.gov/interp/mar06/
int1051.pdf.
21

Id.

22 The press and others have referred to the regulatory gaps as “lacuna,” clearly a polite euphemism
for loopholes. In light of the opaque consequences of these loopholes, they seem more like financial
black holes.

2009]

GREENSPAN’S LAMENT

207

rails, causing Greenspan’s “state of shocked disbelief.”23 It is here that we need to
retrace the “whole intellectual edifice.”24
A. Efficiency
In theory, inefficiency wastes resources, benefiting no one.25 The foundation
principle of exchange efficiency in market economies is known as “Pareto Efficient
Allocation” because it is “[a]n allocation of resources in which no mutually beneficial
trading opportunities are unexploited.26 That is, an allocation in which no person
can be made better off without someone else being made worse off.”27 Under this
principle, “individuals decide for themselves whether particular trades improve
utility.”28 Thus, the first brick in the economic foundation of a market economy is
freedom of contract, because it allows individuals to optimize their utility and, in the
aggregate, optimizes society’s welfare.29
The next row of bricks in the foundation expands on the premise that when
persons exchange freely, using the competitive equilibrium price as the medium of

23

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.

24

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.

25 One economics textbook for undergraduates compares efficiency in economics to how the term is
used in mechanical engineering by comparing outputs to inputs. For example, the text analyzes the
quantity of usable power obtained from a given quantity of fuel input. CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL,
ECONOMICS 25 (6th ed. 1975); see also CARLTON & PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
102-105 (2d ed. 1994) (“The competitive equilibrium of price and quantity has two desirable efficiency
properties . . . production is efficient in the sense that all products are produced at the minimum
possible cost . . . there is no possible rearrangement of resources (such as labor, machines and raw
materials) among firms that can increase the output of one product without also reducing the output
of at least one other product. . . . The amount of each product produced and consumed is efficient. . .
. No rearrangement of goods among consumers can benefit one consumer without harming at least
one other. . . The cost to society of a market not operating efficiently is called deadweight loss.”).

WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 235 (6th
ed. 1995).

26

27

Id.

28

Id.

29 See id. at 106, 546-547 (tracing Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” through Pareto, Edgeworth, and
others to explain the efficiency optimizing role of free exchange between parties and the use of price
to ensure optimal allocation of resources across society).
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exchange, they will optimize their utility and participate in uncoerced bargaining.30 In
the aggregate, this leads to the optimal allocation of resources for society without a
formal market mechanism.31 Libertarians and proponents of laissez-faire theories of
economics might stop here, but the mortar that holds this row together is a set of
assumptions about when, if ever, we have “competitive equilibrium prices.”
Key among the assumptions underpinning the notion of competitive
equilibrium that need to be understood before developing policy recommendations
and institutional incentive mechanisms include the following: that actors are rational,
that they have complete information, and that the market is not distorted by
imperfect competition because agents assert market power.32 Another essential
assumption in this paradigm is that the market interactions of participants do not
include externalities whereby prices no longer capture benefits and costs because
such externalities interfere with the ability of the price mechanism to optimally
allocate resources.33 Even this partial set of caveats should cause us to pause and ask
if the “competitive equilibrium price” exists at all in practice. Another point worth
mentioning is that the theoretical foundation for this efficient allocation mechanism
has no premise in equity; the theory does not address anything concerning the initial
allocations to the parties.34

Id. at 229-251 (describing exchange benefits from voluntary trade, deriving the Edgeworth Box
diagram of Pareto efficiency, and using those to derive contract curves whereby market equilibrium
prices show traders how to obtain efficient allocations of resources).
30

31

Id.

See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 25 at 86-87 (“Perfect competition provides a benchmark
against which the behavior of other markets is judged. . . . We define perfect competition as a market
outcome in which all firms produce homogeneous, perfectly divisible output and face no barriers to
entry or exit; are price takers; and there are no externalities.”); see also NICHOLSON supra note 26, at
563 (“Although the number of departures from perfect competition that we might discuss is
practically infinite, they can be classed into three general groupings that include the most interesting
cases: (1) imperfect competition, (2) externalities, (3) public goods. . . ‘Imperfect competition’ includes
all those situations in which economic agents exert some market power in determining price.”).
32

33

See id. at 546, 559-60, 565-68.

See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
1977) (1971) (giving a discussion of equity and initial allocations and positing a thought experiment
based on a contract that we might have wanted to strike with each other and with the institutions of
society before we were born into our initial endowments. Rawls calls this the “original position”
behind the “veil of ignorance.” He goes on to derive two fundamental fairness rules for organizing
our “contract” that might be paraphrased as “to do unto others as you would have others do unto
you,” and to organize institutions to create the opportunity to receive as much benefit as possible
without taking away from everyone else).
34
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Of course, the edifice still has many stories, but given this partial—yet
substantive—list of imperfections, like Greenspan’s own introspective comment,
one might begin to ask how the craze over deregulation and privatization ever gained
so much capital. Indeed, the explanatory retort to Mr. Greenspan could proceed
along numerous lines, but because this article is dedicated to exploring the
intersection of banking and securities regulations with respect to the recent financial
crisis, the analysis emphasizes the role of externalities and information and how they
affect participants. This leads us to a string of Nobel Prize winning economists and
to their thoughtful explorations of how these assumptions affect outcomes and the
behavior of participants.
B. Externalities
In economic terms, “[a]n externality occurs whenever the activities of one
economic agent affect the activities of another agent in ways that are not reflected in
market transactions.”35 Coase explained that when markets face externalities,
governments are in a position to participate and thereby change the delimitation of
rights, but they do so with transactional costs.36 Coase cautioned:
The problem which we face in dealing with actions which have
harmful effects is not simply one of restraining those responsible for
them. What has to be decided is whether the gain from preventing
the harm is greater than the loss which would be suffered elsewhere
as a result of stopping the action which produces the harm. . . .37
....
. . . [T]he problem is to devise practical arrangements which
will correct defects in one part of the system without causing more
serious harm in other parts.38
....
A second feature of the usual treatment of the problems
discussed in this article is that analysis proceeds in terms of a
35

See NICHOLSON, supra note 26, at 802.

36

R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, J.L. & ECON., Oct. 1960, at 1, 18.

37

Id. at 27.

38

Id. at 34.
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comparison between a state of laissez-faire and some kind of ideal
world. . . . A better approach would seem to be to start our analysis
with a situation approximating that which actually exists, to examine
the effects of a proposed policy change and to attempt to decide
whether the new situation would be, in total, better or worse than the
original one. In this way, conclusions for policy would have some
relevance to the actual situation.39
....
It would be clearly desirable if the only actions performed
were those in which what was gained was worth more than what was
lost. But in choosing between social arrangements within the context
of which individual decisions are made, we have to bear in mind that
a change in the existing system which will lead to an improvement in
some decisions may well lead to a worsening of others. Furthermore
we have to take into account the costs involved in operating the
various social arrangements (whether it be the working of a market or
of a governmental department), as well as the costs involved in
moving to a new system. In devising and choosing between social
arrangements we should have regard for the total effect. This, above
all, is the change in approach I am advocating.40
Continuing with the discussion of externalities and resting on the firm
foundation laid by Coase, Demsetz elaborated on the connection between laws
granting property rights, which express the “consent of fellowmen to allow him to
act in particular ways,” their specification of how persons may be harmed or
benefited, and who must pay to modify the actions of others.41 After recognizing
that society grants property rights through laws, customs, and regulations, Demsetz
explained:
A primary function of property rights is that of guiding
incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities. Every
cost and benefit associated with social interdependencies is a
potential externality. One condition is necessary to make costs and
benefits externalities. The cost of a transaction in the rights between
39

Id. at 43.

40

Id. at 44.

41

Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 347 (May 1967).
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the parties (internalization) must exceed the gains from
internalization. In general, transacting cost can be large relative to
gains because of “natural” difficulties in trading or they can be large
because of legal reasons. In a lawful society the prohibition of
voluntary negotiations makes the cost of transacting infinite. Some
costs and benefits are not taken into account by users of resources
whenever externalities exist, but allowing transactions increases the
degree to which internalization takes place.42
Demsetz helps us understand that laws and regulations change the
boundaries of ownership rights, creating externalities. This is a dynamic process:
If the main allocative function of property rights is the
internalization of beneficial and harmful effects, then the emergence
of property rights can be understood best by their association with
the emergence of new . . . and harmful effects.
....
. . . New techniques, new ways of doing . . . things—all
invoke harmful and beneficial effects to which society has not been
accustomed. It is my thesis in this part of the paper that the
emergence of new property rights takes place in response to the
desires of the interacting persons for adjustment to new benefit-cost
possibilities.
The thesis can be restated in a slightly different fashion:
property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of
internalization become larger than the cost of internalization.
Increased internalization, in the main, results from changes in
economic values, changes which stem from the development of new
technology and opening of new markets, changes to which old
property rights are poorly attuned. A proper interpretation of this
assertion requires that account be taken of a community’s preferences
for private ownership. . . .
. . . These adjustments have arisen in Western societies
largely as a result of gradual changes in social mores and in common
42

Id. at 348.
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law precedents. At each step of this adjustment process, it is unlikely
that externalities per se were consciously related to the issue being
resolved. These legal and moral experiments may be hit-and-miss
procedures to some extent but in a society that weights the
achievement of efficiency heavily, their viability in the long run will
depend on how well they modify behavior to accommodate to the
externalities associated with important changes in technology or
market values.43
The balance of Demsetz’s paper deals with the dichotomy between
communal and private ownership and how internalization under private ownership
avoids the externalities associated with problems such as the “tragedy of the
commons,” and is used to preface the body of property law in a major textbook on
the subject.44 Seen in the context of the Cold War and the contemporary debate
between communism and capitalism, the fact that Demsetz’s disciples focused more
on the ideological implications of his paper illustrates two of Demsetz’s points: that
legal rules need to be seen in their social context and that the adjustments comprise a
dynamic set of “hit and miss procedures.”45
As a bookmark at this point, let’s apply the principles described by Coase and
Demsetz to the recent history of the collateralization of mortgage backed securities
and the broad based explosion of derivatives like credit default swaps. As financial
services integrated and the deregulation of banking allowed the creation of
commonly owned holding companies in the investment and banking fields, the
regulations in response to these new techniques provided incentives to market
participants like banks and hedge funds to internalize the benefits of these changes
while externalizing the costs. This raised a systemic risk to the rest of society. Both
the revolution in products and technology and the regulatory changes were
externalities. Because the transaction costs were lower than the gains, the market
actors modified their ownership boundaries to capture the benefits by internalizing
revenues from these new products while externalizing their risks and costs.46
43

Id. at 350.

44

JESSEE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 35-50 (6th ed. 2006).

See supra note 43 and accompanying text. Demsetz’s paper was published in 1967, the height of the
Cold War.
45

46 This is what I mean when I say they “poisoned the well.” Excluding acts of fraud, and without
reference to intent or scienter to misrepresent, the intentional behavior of executives, directors, and
officers of financial companies seeking to optimize return to their shareholders, to the extent
permitted within the boundaries of fraud, was rational. Practicing attorneys who seek to find liability
on the part of officers and directors of these firms might consider borrowing a page from
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Recognizing this in the context of the current financial crisis leads to significantly
different policy prescriptions than those associated with problems of information
asymmetry, the subject of the next section.
C. Information Symmetry
Another deviation from competitive equilibrium results from asymmetric
information. In his seminal work on the relationship between quality and
uncertainty, Akerloff notes that in markets where buyers use statistics to judge
quality, “there is incentive for sellers to market poor quality” resulting in a difference
between social and private returns and a case for either government intervention or
the possibility that private institutions (i.e., insurance) will rise to capture the welfare
benefits.47 Akerloff warned that a concentration of power in private institutions may
lead to “ill consequences.”48 Exposing the interplay among dishonesty, trust, and
gaming for advantage, Akerloff explained how the tension between adverse selection
and moral hazard in insurance, reflecting the underlying quality uncertainty, leads to
market imbalances and the rise of institutional mechanisms to establish trust and
restore balance.49
Beyond the laws and regulations protecting against outright dishonesty or
fraud, insurance, public and private guarantees, brand value, ratings agencies, ratings,
and disclosure rules are all institutional responses to this fundamental tension that
creates a market to bridge the gap between an asset’s true underlying value and the
uncertainty surrounding that value.
Indeed, the Efficient Capital Market
50
Hypothesis is built on the principle that market prices for financial assets, which are
regularly traded, reflect all available information. This hypothesis motivates an array

environmental law and tort theories of nuisance, but such an exploration is beyond the scope of this
paper.
George A. Akerloff, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J.
ECON. 488, 488 (Aug. 1970).
47

48

Id.

49

Id. at 492-500.

See, e.g., DOUGLAS R. EMERY & JOHN D. FINNERTY, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCE WITH CORPORATE
APPLICATIONS 26 (1st ed. 1991) (“Formally, the Principle of Capital Market Efficiency states that
Market Prices of financial assets that are traded regularly in the capital markets reflect all available information and
adjust fully and quickly to ‘new’ information.”).
50
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of Securities and Exchange Commission rules and regulations on disclosure, and it is
further embedded in the jurisprudence surrounding securities cases.51
Without challenging the validity of the hypothesis, the question we need to
address is the role of information in resolving the current crisis. The effective use of
securities laws and the governing of institutions and principles to correct the
problems that have surfaced depend on a clear understanding of the role of
disclosure, as opposed to other deficiencies such as the externalities described above
and dynamic gaming described below. Practically speaking, the fact that market
traders react in milliseconds to perceived and real variations in asset values
exacerbates the fundamental conflict in objectives between a regulatory regime
optimized around transparency and information disclosure and one that optimizes
around protecting the safety and soundness of banking institutions, especially when
they come under stress.
Jumping ahead to more recent literature, the voice of Joseph Stiglitz further
illuminates the importance of information asymmetry in the design of our
institutions:
The recognition that information is imperfect, that obtaining
information can be costly, that there are important asymmetries of
information, and that the extent of information asymmetries is
affected by actions of firms and individuals, has had profound
implications for the wisdom inherited from the past, and has
provided explanations of economic and social phenomena that
otherwise would be hard to understand. . . .52
....
. . . [E]ven small information costs can have large
consequences, and many of the standard results—including the
welfare theorems—do not hold even when there are small
imperfections of information. While one of the standard informal
arguments for decentralization using the price system is its
See, e.g., STEPHEN J. CHOI & A. C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 22
(2d ed. 2008) (“The primary goal of securities regulation in the United States is to reduce the
informational disadvantage facing outside investors.”); Id. at 149-237 (providing a long list of related
SEC regulations, explanations, and cases on “Disclosure and Accuracy”).
51

Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics, 115 Q.J.
ECON. 1441, 1441 (Nov. 2000).
52
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“information economy,” information economics showed that, in
general, efficient decentralization through the price system, without
extensive government intervention, does not result in a constrained
Pareto optimum, that is, even taking into account the costs of
information.53
....
The key question is one of dynamics: how the economy
adapts to new information, creates new knowledge, and how that
knowledge is disseminated, absorbed and used throughout the
economy.
....
Market forces also create the incentive to make noise, which
induces price dispersions, or which induces managers to undertake
activities that obfuscate information (thereby increasing their own
rents).54
D. Game Theory, Mechanism Design, and Implementation
Mention of “dynamics” and the “actions of firms and individuals” brings us
to the vast body of research and literature conducted in parallel with the inquiry into
competitive equilibrium, namely the set of mathematical tools and analytical
techniques known broadly as game theory.55 Although a thorough discussion of
game theory would be well beyond the scope of this article, game theory was integral
to the development of these theories because it approaches the problem from the
view of the players and the rules of play, their assessment of outcomes based on their
imperfect information regarding the strategies and moves of the other players, and
the number of sessions of play involved.56 Optimal outcomes in each state of play
are based on a concept known as Nash equilibrium.57 “In general, a Nash
53

Id. at 1443-44.

54

Id. at 1469-70.

See, e.g., JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSCAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR 1 (Princeton Univ. Press 1944).
55

56

Id. at 12-13.

57

See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
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equilibrium is a specification of strategies—one for each individual—from which no
individual has the incentive to deviate unilaterally.”58
Looking back on how game theory evolved, Maskin explained that “[t]he
theory of mechanism design can be thought of as the ‘engineering’ side of economic
theory,” where Nash equilibrium concepts are used to determine if a desired social
goal can be achieved through the design of social mechanism or institutions.59 He
elaborated:
A mechanism is an institution, procedure, or game for
determining outcomes. Not surprisingly, who gets to choose the
mechanism—i.e., who is the mechanism designer—will once again,
depend on the setting. In the case of public goods, we normally
think of the government providing the goods as also choosing the
method by which the levels of provision and financing are
determined. Similarly, when it comes to sales of assets—where an
auction is the typical mechanism—the asset seller often gets to call the
shots about the rules, i.e., he is the one who chooses the auction
format.
....
Now, in the public framework, if the government knows at
the outset which choice of public goods is optimal, then there is a
simple—indeed, trivial—mechanism for achieving the optimum: the
government has only to pass a law mandating this outcome.
Similarly, if the auctioneer has prior knowledge of which bidders
value the assets the most, he can simply award them directly to those
bidders (with or without payment).60
....
The work inspired by Hurwicz and others has produced a
broad consensus among economists that von Hayek and Mises were,
Eric S. Maskin, Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 567, 571 n.4
(June 2008) (providing an overview of mechanism implementation theory when accepting the Nobel
Prize in Economics in Sweden on December 8, 2007).
58

59

Id. at 567.

60

Id. at 568.
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in fact, correct—the market is the “best” mechanism—in settings
where (a) there are large numbers of buyers and sellers, so that no
single agent has significant market power; and (b) there are no
significant externalities, that is, an agent’s consumption, production,
and information do not affect others’ production or consumption.
However, mechanisms improving the market are generally possible if
either assumption is violated.61
Maskin’s co-recipient of the Nobel Prize for Economics, Roger Myerson,
spoke contemporaneously and traced the history of inquiry into incentive
mechanisms to communicate information:62
A coordination mechanism is a plan for how social decisions
should depend on people’s reported information, and changing the
coordination mechanism in a society effectively changes the game
that its members will play. Given the information, preferences, and
resources that people have in a society, different social coordination
mechanisms could yield different games, each of which could have
many different equilibria. But remarkably, the set of all possible
equilibria of all possible games can be simply characterized by using
the revelation principle . . . [whereby a] feasible set essentially coincides
with the set of incentive-compatible mechanisms, which satisfy certain
incentive constraints. These incentive constraints express the basic fact
that individuals will not share private information or exert hidden
efforts without appropriate incentives.63
....
. . . To decide whether we have a good social institution, we
want to ask how it performs in this communication and coordination
role. If we do not like the performance of our current institutions,
then we may want to reform them, to get an institution that
implements some desired social plan, where a social plan is a

61

Id. at 572.

Roger B. Myerson, Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 586, 586-87
(June 2008) (providing an overview of mechanism design and the tension between adverse selection
and moral hazard when accepting the Nobel Prize in Economics in Sweden on December 8, 2007).

62

63

Id. at 587.
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description of how everyone’s actions should depend on everyone’s
information.64
....
. . . A feasible social coordination plan could be implemented
by many different social institutions, but it is helpful to begin by
considering a very centralized institution where every individual
communicates separately and confidentially with a trustworthy central
mediator.
....
First, to the extent that our social plan depends on
individuals’ private information that is hard for others to observe, we
need to give people an incentive to share their information honestly.
This problem of getting people to share information honestly is
called adverse selection. Second, to the extent that our social plan
requires people to choose hidden actions and exert efforts that are
hard for others to monitor, we need to give people an incentive to act
obediently according to the plan. This problem of getting people to
act obediently to a social plan is called moral hazard. If it is a rational
equilibrium for everyone to be honest and obedient to the central
mediator who is implementing our social coordination plan, then we
say the plan is incentive compatible.
. . . [A]lthough we defined incentive compatibility by thinking
about honesty and obedience in communication with a central
mediator, in fact these incentive-compatible plans characterize
everything that can be implemented by rational equilibrium behavior
in any social institution or mechanism. This assertion of generality is
called the revelation principle.65
Eh voila! All we have to do is design and implement reforms to our incentive
mechanisms and institutions governing banking and securities such that actors
rationally share information honestly and are honest and obedient. That done, we
can move on to solve global warming—but before we buy a new set of snow skis, we
64

Id.

65

Id. at 588.
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might want to consider human nature, competition, and incentives to win, taking our
analysis to actual institutions and the legal infrastructure in which we design and
implement these rule sets of incentive compatible mechanisms. Thereafter, we can
analyze the results of the adjustments and modifications to approximate the
“incentive compatible” ideal balance—a dynamic process subject to the limitations
of real institutions and vulnerable to the law of unintended consequences.
This proposal takes for granted that we are less than satisfied with the
performance of our current institutional mechanisms, and want to reform them, but
we do not want to abandon our belief in individual liberties and free markets. For
that, we turn to a legal analysis.
III. LEGAL FOUNDATION
How we go about developing these incentive compatible institutions and
mechanisms deserves some discussion. Some procedures or rules are described long
in advance, such as procedures or rules established in constitutions. The framers of
the United States Constitution were mechanism designers.66 In addition, when we
speak of a “central mediator,” we are undoubtedly referring to the “government.”67
The government, however, is not a monolithic actor: it has three distinct branches at
both federal and state levels, in addition to numerous levels of local government
authority. Moreover, there are additional hierarchies and regulatory authorities
within those branches. In discussing banking and securities, this article will simplify
matters by focusing only on the federal government. However, it is impossible to
lump the three branches of federal government together and retain the degree of
completeness needed to explore incentive compatibility and mechanism design
reform in the securities and banking fields.
Using a systems perspective, this section offers a simplified view of how laws
are formed, implemented, and adjudicated in a dynamic process involving social
choice theory, and feedback—much like genetic adaptation in natural systems that
optimize heuristically through learning, trial, and error.68 Breaking the overall system
See Maskin, supra note 58, at 568 (“In the case of national political elections, by contrast, a
mechanism is an electoral procedure, e.g. plurality rule, run-off voting, or the like. Morevoer the
procedure is ordinarily prescribed long in advance, indeed sometimes by the country’s constitution.
Thus, here we should think of the framers of the constitution as the mechanism designers.”).
66

Id. (“[I]n the public framework, if the government knows at the outset which choice of public
goods is optimal, then there is a simple—indeed, trivial—mechanism for achieving the optimum: the
government only has to pass a law mandating this outcome.”).
67

68 See, e.g., RALPH W. PIKE, OPTIMIZATION FOR ENGINEERING SYSTEMS 5, 304 (Van
Nostrand Reinhold Co. 1986) (1935) (“Dynamic programming converts a large, complicated
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into the stages of formation, implementation, and adjudication, the law can be seen
in a dynamic programming context through which we can explore the questions of
system optimality, mechanism design, and implementation.69

optimization problem into a series of interconnected smaller ones, each containing only a
few variables. The result is a series of partial optimizations requiring a reduced effort to find
the optimum, even though some of the variables may have to be enumerated throughout
their range. . . . Then, the dynamic programming algorithm can be applied to the find the
optimum of the entire process by using the connected partial optimizations of the smaller
problems.”); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 481
(1997) (“‘Systems analysis’ is a methodology developed in the fields of engineering, business
information systems, and computer programming specifically to manage complexity.
Instead of screening complexity out, the systems analyst attempts to accommodate as much
complexity as possible. A comprehensive description of the system’s functioning is a
precondition to the analysis. Abstraction is employed sparingly, and, in the kind of systems
analysis that is advocated in this Article, every concept is operationalized, so that every
proposition can be tested empirically. Systems analysis proceeds by identifying systems,
discovering their goals or attributing goals to them, mapping their subsystems and the
functions each performs, determining their internal structures, depicting them with attention
paid to efficiency of presentation, and searching for internal inconsistencies. These methods
generate analytical power by increasing the number of goals, elements, and circumstances
that the analyst can take into account simultaneously. These methods also provide a language
by which to express the kinds of relationships that are commonly encountered.”); id. at 485
(“Systems analysis regards systems as goal-seeking. That is, systems analysis regards each
system as having one or more purposes or functions.”); Matthew O. Jackson, Mechanism
Theory 4-5 (Dec. 8, 2003), http://www.stanford.edu/~jacksonm/mechtheo.pdf (“A theme
that comes out of the literature is that it is often impossible to find mechanisms compatible
with individual incentives that simultaneously result in efficient decisions (maximizing total
welfare), the voluntary participation of the individuals, and balanced transfers (taxes and
subsidies that always net out across individuals). Nevertheless, there are important settings
where incentives and efficiency are compatible and in other settings a ‘second best’ analysis
is still possible”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 476
(1897) (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. admonished against thinking the law could be worked
out like a mathematical equation, but he also considered jurisprudence as “simply law in its
most generalized part . . . [the means for which is] to follow the existing body of dogma into
its highest generalizations by the help of jurisprudence; next, to discover from history how it
has come to be what it is; and, finally, so far as you can, to consider the ends which the
several rules seek to accomplish, the reasons why those ends are desired, what is given up to
gain them, and whether they are worth the price.”).
69 See generally Daniel J. Boyle, The Dao of Jurisprudence: The Art and Science of Optimal Justice
(2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Transactions: The Tennessee Journal of Business Law).
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A. An Explanation of the Dynamic Model
The figure below breaks “the law” into four distinct stages, each of which is
an elaborate decision making process: Stage 0 is the mediation of reality.70 Stage 1 is
the formation of law in the political and legislative process. Stage 2 is the
implementation of legislation through the regulatory and rulemaking process, which
is usually performed as an executive function. Finally, stage 3 is the adjudication
process, where individual cases or controversies are resolved in a series of state and
federal courts, with some cases leading to the U.S. Supreme Court.71 The process is
interlinked and interdependent. The nuance of each stage could be captured in
elaborate process and substantive descriptions, but that effort would be beyond the
scope of this article. For present purposes, assuming that the model roughly (but
accurately) captures the essential elements of our legal processes, we can weigh the
performance against the objectives of the system and its sub-stages, the separate and
common constraints affecting decisions at each stage and level within the stage, and
how the output of one stage places boundaries on the performance of subsequent
stages.72 This model attempts to capture our American system of jurisprudence,
70

Id. at 8 (explaining that reality is mediated in multiple stages in order to convert it into language).

This model is based on the U.S. system of jurisprudence. Variations would be required to describe
the process in other countries and cultures. See, e.g., BRIAN K. LANDBSERG & LESLIE GIELOW
JACOBS, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (West 2007). That said, there is no reason that
U.S. style incentives and regulations are not compatible with those of Europe even though the details
of parliamentary process and code based legal regimes (as opposed to common law) create differences
in practice. One could even develop a system description based on other models, like that which
exists in contemporary China, with a dominant and singular authority under the Communist party, but
where legislation evolves toward approval in what leaders there call “democracy within the party.”
17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 2007: Planning China’s Next Five Years,
CPC Inner Party Democracy: Theory Practice and Institutionalization,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/228201.htm. Skeptical and interested readers should also
consult RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW (2002); DANIEL
C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (West 2003).
71

72 To understand the impact of a given stage and process on subsequent stages and overall
performance, imagine a power plant, with a fuel processing system, a boiler, a turbine, a generator,
and an electrical substation. Our objective as a society is to optimize the transformation of the energy
in the fuel into a form useful for people, widely disbursed through the electricity grid at a minimum
cost and with a minimum of impact on the environment. The plant is subject to countless
constraints: air pollution limits, noise levels, hours of operation, community setting, access to water
sources, etc. Each level of the system has efficiency implications for the overall transformation
process. Practical (cost constrained designs) efficiencies of boilers are in the 90% area, but a turbine’s
ability to extract work energy from steam is in the upper 30% regime. Generators and substations are
each in the upper 90% ballpark, while transmission systems vary based on numerous factors. Each of
these stages needs to be optimized independently, but due to their interconnected nature, the best the
overall system can perform is around 30%. Alternatively, consider the human body which needs air,
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premised on the United States Constitution; although, adaptation for other systems
could lead to corollary conclusions. The Constitution had multiple objectives: to
establish and define the role and function of government, to define the interaction
between the federal and state governments, and to lay out several basic principles
regarding individual liberty.73 As that document and its creators attempted to
balance competing and multiple objectives while constrained in their efforts by their
own limitations, time pressures and politics, the Constitution is commonly
understood by Americans as the optimal symbol of democracy and legitimacy.

A Dynamic and Evolving Decision Model of the Interlinked Stages of “The Law”

Return Function

Return Function

Return Function

HOLDINGS

RULES, REGS & PROCEDURES

STATUTES

Stage 3
“The Law”

Adjudication
(Judicial Process)
Courts

Stage 2
“The Law”

Implementation
(Legal Process)
Executive

Stage 1
“The Law”

Formation
(Political Process)
Legislature

“The Law”

Decision Variables that Can Be Independently Manipulated: Goals, Interpretations, Constraints

Mediated Reality: Stage 0
Feedback Loop

Pragmatic Questions: What is the Optimal Performance of This Process ? How Do We Ensure It ?

food and water to exist. To the extent that the lungs and the digestive track fail to perform their
functions, the performance of the heart and circulation system are affected, ultimately diminishing the
performance of the brain and nervous system. Too much or too little at any stage affects the overall
performance; limits exist at all levels.
See, e.g, NORMAN REDLICH, JOHN ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4-5 (3d ed. 2005) (commenting on the enormous undertaking of the framers
who sought to protect individual liberty while empowering the government to respond to public
needs. Quoting James Madison from The Federalist No. 51, “If men were angels, no government
would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on
government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over
men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the governed,
and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”).
73
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The above systems depiction provides a framework within which we can
map the underlying dynamics of how laws are formed in one stage of the process by
a group of actors with their own set of objectives. Then, the laws are implemented
through multiple executive branch agencies that have another set of bureaucratic
incentives and motivations. Finally, these laws are adjudicated within the context of
particular cases and controversies involving individual factual circumstances by a
multi-tiered set of judicial authorities, constrained at each stage by different rules and
considerations. What is worse, within our system of democracy we impose the rule
that decisions and rules cannot be made by a dictator. According to social choice
theory and the Arrow Impossibility Theorem as well as the work of Sen and others,
we are reminded that we cannot always achieve every goal.74
Sen may have been thinking about the complex mess of banking regulations
and its inscrutable interconnection to securities rules when he accepted the Nobel
Prize in 1998 with these remarks:
“A camel,” it has been said, “is a horse designed by a
committee.” This might sound like a telling example of the terrible
deficiencies of committee decisions, but it is really much too mild of
an indictment. A camel may not have the speed of a horse, but it is a
very useful animal—well coordinated to travel distances without food
or water. A committee that tries to reflect the diverse wishes of its
different members in designing a horse could easily end up with
something far less congruous: perhaps a centaur of Greek
mythology, half a horse and half something else—a mercurial
creation combining savagery with confusion.75
To push the use of metaphor, when we speak of how the law evolves, we
often use genetic or evolutionary references, and frankly, some babies are ugly.76
74 Amartya Sen, The Possibility of Social Choice, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 351 (June 1999); see also William
T. Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective Choice: Arrow’s Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative
Power to Administrative Agencies, 1986 DUKE L. J. 948, 948 (1986) (decrying the fact that delegation of
authority to modern administrative agencies as “technocratic governance” to get around Arrow’s
dictatorship constraint); see KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1963))
(This theory shows that in the formation stage of the law, an individual’s optimal value outcomes are
unachievable. “Collective rationality in the social choice mechanism is not merely an illegitimate
transfer from the individual to society but an important attribute of a genuinely democratic system
capable of fully adapting to a varying environment.”). Id. at 120
75

Sen, supra note 74, at 351.

76 Scholars of banking law and Title 12 of the U.S.C. should agree, but more seriously, by addressing
the stages of the above model independently and recognizing that they are interlinked through the
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What we have in the formation and implantation of mechanisms, far from those
circumstances where theorists can devise a Nash Equilibrium solution, is a never
ending dynamic game. The game is characterized by multiple actors whose actions
are interdependent and affect each other like externalities—their own motives and
strategies represent a complex mix of adverse selection and moral hazard. Our legal
structure and its evolutionary and dynamic responses are ill-suited to self-correct
when short term external pressures threaten systemic collapse.
The legislative and regulatory dynamic responses are also ill-matched to that
of market participants in the real game of the economy. Market participants trade in
real time, with as much information as is available, and (presumably) based on a
rational assessment of the impact of events on values. In a steady state situation,
their trading leads to some fundamental fluctuations in prices, a sine wave type
periodic function whose frequency and period vary according to the underlying asset
and the dynamics of the industry.77 These periodic fluctuations are superimposed
upon trends of the underlying variables, such as interest rate tendencies, inflation,
growth rates, and a host of industry specific supply and demand variables.78 These
trend variables can be in line or out of line with the underlying periodic changes, and
their own periodicity between inversions can vary.79 But when a shock occurs that
affects all of the participants instantaneously, it throws this ebb and flow into chaos,
and a fractal pattern emerges and dominates prices.80 If this shock is large enough, it
evolving state variable labeled “the law,” one can begin to see how variations in the return function
(objective) and constraints at each stage affect not only the stage’s performance but also the
performance of the integrated system. Through the dynamic process, over time, with feedback, and
with society’s evolving views of morality to mediate reality, “the law” evolves dynamically. This
evolution mirrors genetic evolution, and this trend is clearly seen in the way U.S. Supreme Court cases
evolve around the optimization of different principles through generations of cases. For instance, we
can trace the evolution of the Supreme Court’s resolution of the inherent conflict between individual
freedom to contract with a state’s rights to regulate economic behavior in a series of cases from
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 49 (1905) (holding in a divided opinion that interference with the
freedom of parties to contract with each other violates the Constitution) and its progeny to Williamson
v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348, 491 U.S. 483 (1955) (rejecting the logic of Lochner and establishing
the rational basis test to determine the validity of statutes governing economic activity).
See, e.g., SIMON WREN-LEWIS & REBECCA L. DRIVER, REAL EXCHANGE RATES FOR THE YEAR
2000 (Institute for International Economics 1998) (explaining the various time domains of
fundamentals, trends, and short term effects in the case of currencies).
77

78

Id.

EDGAR E PETERS, FRACTAL MARKET ANALYSIS: APPLYING CHAOS THEORY TO INVESTMENT
AND ECONOMICS (1994) (offering the Fractal Market Hypothesis as an alternative to the Efficient

79

Market Hypothesis)

80

Id.
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can create a herding effect, pushing the underlying system to a tipping point.81 This
phenomenon mirrors natural systems, and it is characteristic of many organized
social systems.82
For the current crisis, Peters’s comments provide helpful insight:
Liquidity is not the same as trading volume. The largest
crashes have occurred when there has been low liquidity but high
trading volume. Another name for low liquidity could be imbalanced
trading volume.
The EMH [Efficient Market Hypothesis] says nothing about
liqudity. It says that prices are always fair when liquidity exists or not,
or, alternatively, that there is always enough liquidity. Thus, the
EMH cannot explain crashes and stampedes; when liquidity vanishes,
getting a “fair” price may not be as important as completing the trade
at any cost.
A stable market is not the same as an “efficient” market, as
defined by the EMH. A stable market is a liquid market. If the
market is liquid, then the price can be considered close to “fair.”
However, markets are not always liquid. When lack of liquidity
strikes, participating investors are willing to take any price they can,
fair or not.83

81

Id.

See, e.g., BENOIT B. MANDELBROT, FRACTALS AND SCALING IN FINANCE: DISCONTINUITY,
CONCENTRATION AND RISK (Springer 1997) (explaining how memory of recent events affects
decisions and leads to the need to use non Gaussian statistics and mathematics to describe financial
functions).
82

83

PETERS, supra note 79, at 42.
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B. An Illustration84
The process of advocating regulation and deregulation and then gaming the
loopholes in a given actor’s best short-term interest is not a new phenomenon.
Government involvement and oversight of the banking industry has been an integral
part of U.S. jurisprudence and politics since the beginning of the Republic.85 In
McCulloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court asserted the supremacy of the federal
regulatory role over the states in regulating banking when it barred Maryland from
interfering or inhibiting in the operation of the Second Bank of The United States.86
Andrew Jackson vetoed a law to re-charter the Second Bank of the United States in
1832, leading states to over-issue bank notes and credit, which ultimately caused the
collapse of hundreds of state banks during the depression of 1837.87
Since then, the courts have periodically faced questions over the
government’s role in regulating commerce through the operation of banks.88
Deregulation of interest accounts and deposits under the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 was influenced by nonbank
84 This section uses banking regulations to illustrate the general points raised above, but similar
illustrations could be found in the regulation and re-regulation of transportation, electric utilities,
natural gas, and other industries. For example, witness ENRON’s behavior following the Energy
Policy Act of 1992 and the national move to deregulate the electricity sector, leading to the
Congressional response of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the related wave of litigation over ENRON’s
gaming behavior as it related to the California energy crisis early in this decade. See, e.g., Jeffrey D.
Van Niel, Enron—The Primer, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 3
(Rapoport and Dharan, eds. 2003) (describing Enron’s game playing schemes which they labeled as
Death Star, Fat Boy, Ricochet, Load Shift, and others in California); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Credit Suisse First Boston (U.S.A.), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 377, 393 (5th Cir. 2007) (describing Enron’s
deceptive schemes but failing to find liability for the witting investment bankers who acquiesced
silently).

See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS 13 (2nd ed. 2005) (explaining that the first Bank of the United States was a “quasigovernmental banking entity designed to regulate or control the supply of credit and currency, and to
monitor and facilitate transactions in credit and currency” and that it was developed after President
Washington mediated a debate among Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison over the Constitutionality of
Congressional power to establish such a bank. It ran for twenty years until its Charter expired in
1811).
85

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 324-25 (1819) (holding the Supreme Court had ultimate
authority to interpret the Constitution and that Congress had the power to incorporate the Bank of
the United States despite the fact its formation was not an explicitly enumerated power).

86

87

MALLOY, supra note 85, at 18-19.

88 Id. at 1-81; see, e.g., id. at 25-27 (illustrating that between 1913 and 2001, Congress passed some
thirty-seven acts to regulate and re-regulate banks and commerce).
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competition in demand deposits, and it led to new products for the savings and loan
industry.89 The widespread failure of the saving and loan institutions ultimately cost
the U.S. taxpayers some $90 billion.90 In each of these cycles, Congress responded to
perceived market failures, and the market actors reacted by restructuring and
reinvesting in the perceived opportunities to profit. This led to market failures and
bank losses, which led to more regulation, deregulation, and re-regulation.
Greenspan’s worldview is based on a paradigm integral to democratic society
and institutions: the freedom to contract, the recognition of private property rights,
and limited government interference to allow competition to determine outcomes.
These views have been supported for centuries as the bedrock of efficiency and
utility in democratic market societies.91 So, who wins when banks compete?
American society considers this question to be rhetorical. As LendingTree.com
notes in its corporate trademark: “When banks compete, you [the consumer]
wins.”92
But can you win if we all lose? Isn’t the invisible hand of the market the way
to optimal outcomes for society? “Deregulation” supposes so—yet a prime suspect
as the origin of the current mortgage foreclosure crisis is the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act of 1999, which explicitly deregulated commercial and investment banks to allow
them to combine forces and eliminated many of the provisions of the Glass-Steagall
Act of 1933.93 The Glass-Steagall Act had been a principal reform of the Great
Depression and its banking crisis, and the act specifically prohibited common
ownership, control, and product offerings between investment and commercial
89

MALLOY, supra note 85, at 60-76.

JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 30
(Thompson West 2008) (2004) (“When real estate values collapsed at the end of the 1980s, all of the
problems that had been building in the S&Ls were exposed and hundreds of S&Ls failed. A majority
of the distressed thrift associations were in California and Texas. In 1987, the S&L industry lost some
$7 billion. In 1988, over 700 banks and over 1,000 S&Ls were being closed down. Costs to taxpayers
from the failed S&Ls were predicted to range from $500 billion to $1 trillion. One Congressional
subcommittee called the S&L crisis ‘the greatest financial fiasco the United States has ever seen.’
Regulators estimated that forty percent of the thrift failures were due to fraud or insider abuse. By
1992, some 1,000 individuals had been charged with crimes in connection with S&L activities. . . .
The final cost to American taxpayers for the S&L crisis proved to be much less than originally
estimated, but still totaled at least $90 billion.”).
90

See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1983); ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (1776).

91

92

Lending Tree Home Loans, http://www.lendingtree.com/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).

93

Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
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banking interests.94 Advocates of Gramm-Leach-Bliley believed that Glass-Steagall
was outmoded and that banks needed the freedom to offer the same services as
investment banks in order to compete and survive.95
Was there a causal link between the passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley in 1999
and the subprime lending of recent years? If so, were there regulators who
understood the history and should have known better? In fairness, by the time
Gramm-Leach-Bliley passed, the integration of financial and banking services had
progressed dramatically.96 Undoubtedly, there were numerous competitive factors
that pushed lending institutions in the race to the bottom along the primrose path we
now find ourselves: simplifying the application process for loans to only checking
credit scores, lowering the threshold of which scores would qualify, offering 100%
and higher loan to value ratios (because real estate—presumably—would never
decline in value), and providing subprime initial interest rates to capture the loan. It
is rational to infer from this competitive behavior that banks intended to make up
losses on individual loans by making more loans and charging hidden fees, or by
simply passing the risk of default along through the bundling process. These
competitive pressures were only amplified when co-owned commercial and
investment banks began using the secondary market to shift the risk of these loans
immediately to a broader market through the syndication process of bundling the
mortgages into mortgage-backed securities and selling them to pension funds,

Glass-Steagall Act of 1933: Definition from Answers.com, http://www.answers.com/topic/glasssteagall-act-of-1933 (last visited Jan. 20, 2009) (“Many economic and political factors led to the
financial crisis that began in 1929, but the general breakdown of the U.S. banking system during the
period from 1929 to 1932 certainly played a significant role in the crisis. It was this systemic failure
that led Congress to review and reform the Federal Reserve System and the national banking system
as well. In particular, the Banking Act of 1933, known as the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) (48 Stat. 162),
made several significant changes in the federal regulation of banks. Primary among these was the
separation of commercial banking from investment banking.”); see also Reem Heakal, What Was the
Glass-Steagall Act?, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/071603.asp?viewall=1 (last visited
August 3, 2008) (explaining the rationale behind the restrictions between commercial and investment
banks in the Glass-Steagall Act and the supreme court decisions leading to the modifications in the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act).
94

95Terry

S. Schwakopf, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: A New Frontier in Financial Services, FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK OF SAN FRANSISCO, http://www.frbsf.org/publications/banking/gramm/ (last visited August
2, 2008).
96 See MALLOY, supra note 85, for a discussion of several regulatory rulings and court cases allowing
banks to compete in the financial services industry prior to the passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley.
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sovereign wealth funds, and other banks.97 In the jargon of the day, the banks were
selling hats to each other.
Title 12, Part 560 of the Code of Federal Regulations covers Banks and
Banking, Lending and Investment. Generally, there are three categories of mortgage
financing:
1.
Conforming or Conventional Loans: These loans are for creditqualifying borrowers who own and occupy the real estate, are not past due on child
support, and meet individual loan guidelines. The financing is for residences, and the
borrower pays a down payment ranging from at least five to twenty percent.98
2.
Alt-A Loans: This kind of loan occurs when the bank lends money
to persons based on reduced documentation of income and assets (“stated income,”
“stated assets,” or “no income verification”), where the debt to income is above
conforming standards, where the credit history has problems that don’t quite rise to
subprime loan levels but are not good enough for a conforming loan, or where the
loan to value ratio or occupancy is non-conforming.99 These loans were less likely to
be picked up by the secondary market and carried considerably higher risk.100 The
IndyMac collapse, estimated to cost the Federal Deposit Insurance Fund between $4
billion and $8 billion, occurred because much of IndyMac’s portfolio was built on
Alt-A loans requiring little evidence of buyer income or assets.101

See, e.g., Michael P. Malloy, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Bank Regulation, 27 BANKING & FIN.
SERVICES POL’Y REP. 1 (2008), reprinted in MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES
LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 39 (2d ed. 2008-2009 Supp.) (providing a diagrammatic and
systemic overview of the cyclic process from mortgage origination to debt collateralization and sale to
institutional investors, and the cash flow returns back to originators as the engine of motivation
propelling the process seemingly forever).
97

98 See, e.g., General Loan Requirements, http:www.ahfc.state.ak.us/loans/general-requirements.cfm
(last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
99 See e.g., Mike Heayn, Real Estate 101: The Next Catastrophe, SANTA MONICA DAILY PRESS, Feb. 11,
2009, http://www.smdp.com/Articles-c-2009-02-10-48894.113116_The_next_
catastrophe.html (last visited April 23, 2009); see also Alt-A, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Alt-A (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
100

Id.

101 Catherine Clifford & Chris Isidore, The Fall of IndyMac, (July 13, 2008),
http://money.cnn.com/2008/07/12/news/companies/indymac_fdic/index.hrtm?postversion=2008
071210.
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3.
Subprime: “Subprime mortgage lending typically refers to a loan to
someone whose credit history is insufficient to qualify that borrower for a ‘prime’
loan, such as a loan ‘conforming’ to the underwriting guidelines of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. Poor credit history, including a spotty history or a record of late and
missed payments to creditors, or a recent bankruptcy on the part of the borrower
often qualifies the loan to be considered subprime.”102
Subprime lending provided credit to persons who otherwise would not have
had the opportunity to own a home. Still, cities are now claiming lender practices
were predatory.103 The irony is that the government wanted lenders to provide more
opportunity to less-qualified persons. Technology allowed for rapid application and
decision processes, and the private sector priced in the added risk with higher fees
and prices. Nonetheless, there has been a state and federal consumer protection
outcry and legal action based on legislation such as The Federal Truth in Lending
Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq.,104 and California’s Unfair Competition Law, California
Civil Code section 17200.105
As recently as late-August 2007, the effects of the subprime mortgage crisis
on investment banks and lenders in their “race to the bottom,” where their
competitive practices had ignored the need to price risk into their products, had not
quite been realized.106 Moody’s rating service was still hailing the strength of the U.S.
investment banks and the five big names: Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill
Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns.107 By mid-September 2008, Lehman had
failed; Merrill was bought by Bank of America; Morgan Stanley was “scrambling to
find a buyer”; Goldman Sachs was concerned and losing value; Washington Mutual
Richard E. Gottlieb & Andrew J. McGuinness, When Bad Things Happen to Good Cities: Are Lenders
to Blame?, 17 BUS. L. TODAY 13, 14 (Jul/Aug 2008).

102

103

See id. at 14-15 (listing multiple examples of predatory lending lawsuits).

Michael C. Tomkies, Regulating the Subprime Market: Finding the Right Balance, 17 BUS. L. TODAY 21,
23 (Jul/Aug 2008).
104

Travis P. Nelson, Trends in Subprime Lending: Legislation, Litigation, and Enforcement on the Rise, 17 BUS.
L. TODAY 27 (Jul/Aug 2008).
105

106

See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing this “race to the bottom”).

107Jon

C. Ogg, U. S. Investment Bank Ratings OK, Or So Says Moody’s, (Aug. 29, 2007)
http://www.247wallst.com/2007/08/us-investment-b.html (“Here is a list of the major brokerage
and investment banks in order of market capitalization that are listed as being able to absorb the
malaise: Goldman Sachs (GS) $70 Billion in market cap.; Morgan Stanely (MS) $63+ Billion in market
cap.; Merrill Lynch (MER) $62 Billion in market cap.; Lehman Brothers (LEH) $29 Billion in market
cap.; Bear Stearns (BSC) $15.7 Billion in market cap.”).
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had put itself up for auction; and the government had propped up Bear Stearns,
insurance giant AIG International, and the government-sponsored Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.108 Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act (EESA) and its Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).109
Like his intellectual heirs more than two centuries later, in promoting the first
Bank of the United States, Alexander Hamilton believed that private ownership and
control would ensure the bank would behave in its own long-run interest and not be
harmed by “public necessity.”110 In the aftermath of the subprime lending crisis,
regulatory authorities have found it necessary to caution against “predatory lending
considerations.”111
These authorities have reminded private lenders that
“[f]undamental consumer protection principles relevant to the underwriting and
marketing of mortgage loans include: Approving loans based on the borrower’s
ability to repay the loan according to its terms; and Providing information that
enables consumers to understand material terms, costs, and risks of loan products at
a time that will help the consumer select a product.”112
What really happens when banks compete? Clearly, some banks engage in
predatory lending. For example, in Chicago, an elderly, blind, and ill woman lost her
home to foreclosure.113 Because she was unable to read what she was signing, the
mortgage broker visited her so that she could sign the final loan agreement from her
hospital bed.114 Later, she and her attorney waded through a continuous flow of new
offers to refinance and take on additional credit.115 “The government, for a long
time now, has been on the side of the great corporations, on the side of Wall Street,
108Christian

Plumb, Morgan Stanley in Talks, Financials Slide Resumes, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2008)
http://www.reuters.com/article/bankingFinancial/idUSHKG9362820080918 (describing Morgan’s
frantic search for a buyer, Goldman Sachs concerns, as well as the recent failures of AIG International
and the auction of Washington Mutual).
109

Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 852 (2008).

MALLOY, supra note 85, at 8 (citing Hamilton’s report to President Washington: 1 American State
Papers 67, Treasury Report on a National Bank, December 13, 1790).

110

111 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Division of Banks, Statement on Sub Prime Mortgage Lending,
Regulatory Bulletin 5.1-104, at 5 (September 10, 2007) (defining predatory lending to include either
making loans based on collateral rather than the borrower’s ability to repay, repeatedly charging fees
for necessary refinancing or loan flipping, or fraud or deception in concealing the loan obligation).
112

Id. at 8.
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See id.

114

See id.

115

See id.
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on the side of the financial services industry. So who looks out for the little
people?”116 It seems clear that we need regulations to control these externalities, but
the exact nature is more elusive.
For its part, on July 14, 2008, the Federal Reserve issued its final rule
prohibiting lenders from making loans without taking into account the borrower’s
ability to repay the loan, requiring borrowers to verify their income and assets,
banning prepayment penalties if the payment can change in the first four years, and
requiring creditors to establish escrow accounts for taxes and homeowners’
insurance for all first-lien mortgage loans.117 The rules also protect real estate
secured loans by prohibiting creditors and mortgage brokers from coercing
appraisers into misstating a home’s value and from pyramiding late fees and by
requiring lenders to provide good faith estimates of costs and payment amounts.118
Like Greenspan, a fine financial mind like Hamilton’s might find it incredible
that the government would need to remind private actors of these common sense
principles and that it would take laws and regulations like these to govern such
behavior. But then again, Hamilton never got a mortgage from Countrywide. What
motivations and incentive mechanisms led the attorneys and executives at the
mortgage lenders, credit swap counter parties, insurers, and investment bankers to
game the system and put so much at risk in their quest for returns? More
importantly, what regulatory structures allowed it to happen, and what changes are
needed to correct the deficiencies?
The current crisis shows us that policy matters. As stated by Professor
Malloy:
The 1999 Graham-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) is one of the most
significant pieces of federal banking legislation since the Banking Act
of 1933 itself. Among other things, it works a fundamental change in
the scheme of regulation of securities activities of depository
institutions. The GLBA eliminates prohibitions on affiliations
between commercial and investment banking enterprises and on
interlocking directorates between such enterprises by repealing
Interview by Bill Boyers with Bob Herbert (Aug. 8, 2008), available at http://www.pbs.org/
moyers/journal/08082008/transcript4.html.
116

Press Release, Federal Reserve (July 14, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/bcreg/20080714a.htm.
117

118

Id.

2009]

GREENSPAN’S LAMENT

233

sections 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall. It also authorizes national
banks to deal in, underwrite, and purchase municipal bonds for their
own investment accounts.119
Through the evolution of products and changes in the financial industry, the
pressures of competition had eroded the prophylactic separation between
commercial banking and investment banking found in Glass-Steagall.120 Early on,
however, after the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) had allowed
the First National City Bank of New York to establish and operate collective
investment funds, the Supreme Court drew the line in Investment Co. Institute v.
Camp.121 Speaking for the Court, Justice Stewart interpreted Congress’s original
rationale in separating investment banking activities from those of commercial
banking:
The failure of the Bank of the United States in 1930 was widely
attributed to that bank’s activities with respect to its numerous
securities affiliates.
Moreover, Congress was concerned that
commercial banks in general and member banks of the Federal
Reserve System in particular had both aggravated and been damaged
by stock market decline partly because of their direct and indirect
involvement in the trading and ownership of speculative securities.
The Glass-Steagall Act reflected a determination that policies of
competition, convenience, or expertise which might otherwise
support the entry of commercial banks into the investment banking
business were outweighed by the ‘hazards’ and ‘financial dangers’ that
arise when commercial banks engage in the activities proscribed by
the Act.
The hazards that Congress had in mind were not limited to
the obvious danger that a bank might invest its own assets in frozen
or otherwise imprudent stock or security investments. . . . The
legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act shows that Congress also
had in mind and repeatedly focused on the more subtle hazards that
119

MALLOY, supra note 85, at 553.

120

See id. at 398-488 (providing an exposition of this evolution).

121 Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (denying the ability of national banks to engage
in collective investment funds as securities despite the OCC’s administrative view because Congress
had clearly expressed a series of subtle concerns in stating the purpose of the prohibitions in GlassSteagall).
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arise when a commercial bank goes beyond the business of acting as
fiduciary or managing agent and enters the investment banking
business either directly or by establishing an affiliate to hold and sell
particular investments. . . . 122
Before the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act made the above quoted
opinion moot, the prophylactic prohibition against common ownership between
commercial and investment banking continued to hold. In 1984, in Securities Industries
Ass’n v. Board of Governors,123 the Court affirmed the “subtle risks created by mixing
the two activities justified a strong prophylaxis,” and the Court used the GlassSteagall Act to strike down an effort by Bankers Trust to place commercial paper for
corporate customers.124 However, after remand and in a later opinion in a lower
court, Judge Bork inexplicably converted the string of subtle hazards into a judicial
test.125 He then used the test to let stand an administrative revision stating that the
same sale of commercial paper did not take Bankers Trust into the realm of
investment banking.126 The rest, shall we say, is history.
IV. SUMMARY
1.
The notion of “competitive equilibrium,” used to prove the
conclusion that price and freedom to contract in a market system provide for the
most efficient allocation of resources in the economy, is a myth—it is the equivalent
of the “reasonable person” standard in the law. Though it provides a vital
benchmark, it does not actually exist. The market is never in equilibrium because the
conditions of equilibrium are never met in practice. Regulatory responses are a
dynamic phenomenon, and market actors react to those responses. This process
then loops back on itself. Participants take their grievances over the impact of the
changes to the courts for “justice,” and the laws and regulations are adjudicated,

122 Id. at 629-634. The opinion goes on to list and explain these subtle hazards, which include
promotional pressure, new temptations, impairment to public confidence due to the reputation effects
in the public mind if investments turn sour, pressure to make its credit facilities available to firms
whose securities it sells, pressure to provide issuers with unsound loans, and ultimately, concern that
depositors are put at risk by these relationships and activities. Id.
123

Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 468 U.S. 137 (1984).

124

Id. at 148.

Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005
(1987).

125
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Id.
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providing further incentive to modify behavior and impetus for further regulatory
change.
2.
The notion of competitive equilibrium, despite its merely theoretical
existence, provides a useful benchmark to avoid wasteful allocations of resources.
Several assumptions, including (a) the absence of externalities, (b) information
asymmetry, and (c) rational behavior of the actors, are required in defining the
notion of competitive equilibrium.
3.
When confronted with changes in their environment due to the
emergence of new techniques, technologies, or even regulatory changes, firms and
individuals are free to buy, sell, or transact to reduce their costs. Demsetz and Coase
reveal that at times regulatory changes motivate these adjustments. Regulations
prompt actors to change their property boundaries to adjust their transaction costs
and internalize the benefit created by the new regulations. This process of
adjustment and internalization of benefits reveals that regulations themselves are a
form of externality to any given firm. From a system-wide perspective, those who
create laws and regulations are themselves players in a game-theoretic context.
Mechanism design principles attempt to optimize the performance of these
regulatory distortions of competitive equilibrium.
4.
The revelation principle, the design and implementation of coordination
mechanisms to serve as incentives to encourage firms and persons to simultaneously
share information and to act honestly and obediently, is internal to a system of social
choice and the process of formation, execution, and adjudication of laws and
regulations. As such, like any system, it is subject to a set of optimization constraints
and limitations. Among those are the constructs of social choice theories such as the
Arrow Impossibility Theorem and capture theory.
5.
The dynamic gaming response of those within the system of
incentive mechanisms can create imbalances that are not always predictable, but its
quantitative consequence can be monitored and detected. Players who have
developed techniques to detect these consequences, such as hedge fund “quants,”
have learned to benefit speculatively.
6.
The assumption of self-interested actors who behave rationally in
making their choices and decisions survives once we allow for the presence of
externalities in the form of regulatory incentives that create lacuna that allow them to
reorganize, internalize benefits, and externalize risks that influence their choices;
dynamic responses that reflect imperfect and imperfectly assimilated information;
and the reality that our individual rationality is bound by these factors as well as the
limited time we have to make decisions, the analytical framework, the ideology and
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biases we bring to the decision, and our ability to incorporate the changing effects of
all these factors on the decisions of the other players.
7.
Complex, interdependent, and dynamic problems rarely have
discoverable equilibrium solutions.127 Real processes cannot achieve ideal results.
Thus, the best dynamic strategy for all players within this complex framework is a
heuristic strategy, which means that it adjusts and learns as facts and rule sets change
within a general set of boundaries—specifically, the rules of a civil society.
8.
As an illustration and as applied to the current crisis, the ideology of
encouraging competition and privatization manifested itself in ways that allowed
actors to organize in order to minimize transaction costs and internalize benefits
(grow revenues through the fees collected from the sale of subprime mortgages and
derivative credit instruments) while externalizing costs and risks of downturn and
default—for example, through the collateralization of mortgage-backed securities
and naked shorts on credit default swaps.
9.
In terms of the current regulatory structure, after the Gramm-LeachBliley Act, the policy objectives of banking—safety and soundness of depository
institutions—can be at odds with those of securities regulations—risking disclosure
to allow investors the freedom to make informed, if risky, investment decisions.
This is because the disclosure of news that triggers rapid and illiquid market reactions
and movement can turn into fractal and self-reinforcing behavior that would
undermine safety and soundness.
10.
Aside from immediate measures to stem the decline in underlying
asset prices in housing, regulatory policy prescriptions in recognition of these
constraints, and the need for measures to protect the system from collapse,
regulators need to include prophylactic prohibitions to prevent further

CHRISTOPHER ENGEL & GERD GIGERENZER, HEURISTICS AND THE LAW 1-16 (MIT Press 2006)
(“Heuristics are needed in situations where the world does not permit optimization. For many realworld problems (as opposed to optimization tuned textbook problems), optimal solutions are
unknown because problems are computationally intractable or poorly defined. . . . Heuristics may be
of help in making new laws. In civil countries, the ordinary mechanism for this is legislation.
Consequently, the design of new law is best done by understanding political process. A standard
model from political science, the policy cycle, helps do that. It structures an often messy chain of
events into five steps: agenda setting, problem definition, policy choice, implementation, and
evaluation (May and Wildavsky 1978). Each step is heavily influenced by the heuristics of those
contributing to the legislation. Finally, the process of rule application can capitalize of heuristics. Yet
the heuristics of judges and administrators can also be seen as a problem by the legislator, or by the
scientific observers of the legal order.”).
127
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contamination of the safety and soundness of depository institutions from the
profitable sale of securities whose risk has been socialized.
V. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is a fact of life at this point. We cannot turn
the clock back, but as we seek to make regulatory adjustments, we should remember
the lessons of history. The need to preserve the safety and soundness of banking
and confidence in depository institutions, which was the purpose of banking
regulation, at times stands in contrast to the more nuanced and factually-specific
concerns of investments and securities regulation, designed not to inhibit risk taking
ventures but to force disclosure of that risk to enable investors to decide.
Applying these two policy objectives to today’s situation, where banks face
heightened risk and exposure due to the “toxic” assets on their balance sheets,
regulators should view prophylactic measures with respect to investments by
regulated market participants in any type of speculative derivatives. The causal
connection between these risks and bank reputation effects alone should give pause
to those concerned with bank safety and soundness.
Even if followed, securities regime rules on disclosure cannot keep pace
when rapid declines in values of derivatives or naked positions need to be covered
immediately because illiquidity is self reinforcing. In this respect at least, the use of a
heuristic tool, such as a prophylactic measure, may be the optimal regulatory
approach until a more long-term, structural solution is found.128 Banks and hedge
funds that hold naked derivative default swaps are creating externalities and risking
contamination of the financial system for the rest of us. Our government, of the
people, by the people, and for the people, needs to step up and protect the people—
not the banks and market participants whose self-interested behavior has
contaminated our common source of livelihood.

128 The use of prophylactic measures in law is not uncommon. A famous instance is law enforcement
agencies use of the Miranda warning, which is a prophylactic that ensures that suspects are not
compelled to self-incrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See generally Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966).

